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INTERNATIONAL TRADE
SECTION
Trade in Culture: Consumable Product or
Cherished Articulation of a Nation's Soul?
MICHAEL BRAUN*
LEIGH PARKER*"
I. INTRODUCTION
There are three classic ways to control the culture of another
country: through political coercion, which is less feasible as the Com-
munist collapse demonstrates; through acquisition, which is expensive;
and through flooding.
*.. [FIlood the markets of other countries with your slick, cheap,
heavily advertised product, swamping the local variety until it ceases
to exist.'
Once culture was seen through the artifacts left behind by lost civili-
zations. Later, as man matured, culture was expressed in song and dance
handed down through oral traditions. Today, culture is broadcast across
thousands of miles to the farthest reaches of the globe, disseminated
through radio, television, and film. For the first time since the dawn of
man, the exchange of culture has become a profit making business, forc-
ing nations to create a regime for trade in culture.
In 1948, the nations participating in the first round of the newly es-
tablished General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) could not en-
vision that one day film and television sales would represent a multimil-
lion dollar industry. Accordingly, they neglected to create a regime to
account for trade in culture. Presently, the trading community does not
* J.D., Loyola University, Los Angeles, 1993; B.A., U.C.L.A., 1990. Mr. Braun is cur-
rently working on an LL.M. degree at the London School of Economics.
** J.D., Loyola University, Los Angeles, 1993; M.I.M., American Graduate School of
International Management, 1982; B.A., Indiana University, 1981.
1. Silvia Fraser, Canada and the U.S.: Too Close for Comfort?, WORLDPAPER, Mar.
1992, at 12.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
know whether to classify cultural products as goods, services or a com-
pletely separate entity. With American film and television sales generat-
ing more than $4.5 billion in trade surplus during a time in which the
United States runs a mighty trade deficit, it is evident that "the prosper-
ity of the American economy is increasingly tied to Hollywood's well be-
ing."2 Accordingly, the United States contends that cultural products are
like any other tradeable commodity, subject to the strictures of liberal-
ized trade negotiated under GATT. On the other hand, the European
Community (E.C.),*** struggling against very successful American pro-
gramming, contends that "cultural industries are intrinsically different
from manufacturing and pose unique political problems that defy normal
trade rules."3
In the first confrontation over this issue, the United States was will-
ing to exclude culture from liberalization in the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement. Cognizant of the United States' failure to liber-
alize trade in culture with Canada, the E.C. subsequently passed its "Tel-
evision Without Frontiers" legislation mandating that European televi-
sion consist of at least fifty percent domestically created products.
Although cultural industries in the United States vehemently objected to
the Directive as unwarranted protectionism, the mandatory ratio remains
in full effect and serves as the foundation of other European cultural en-
deavors. Thus far the issue of trade in culture has been enmeshed in the
endless bureaucracy of the Uruguay Round of GATT and will not likely
see a rapid resolution.
This article will trace the evolution of trade in culture, beginning in
Part II with the cultural derogation embodied in the United States-Ca-
nada Free Trade Agreement. This section will identify and analyze the
Canadian rationales for the derogation and the subsequent responses
from the United States. Part III will discuss European cultural initiatives
designed to protect culture, focusing on the 1988 Broadcast Directive.
The rationales and responses will be analyzed and contrasted to those
used in the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Part IV of this
article will look at the viability of treating culture as a tradeable com-
modity under the GATT and alternatively as a service under a General
Agreement for Trade in Services (GATS), ultimately concluding that
neither is adequate. Finally, this article proposes the creation of a Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Culture that acknowledges the unique nature
of culture as both a consumable product as well as the cherished articula-
tion of a nation's soul.
2. Bruce Stokes, Tinseltown Trade War, NAT'L J., Feb. 23, 1991, at 432.
*** The European Community changed its official name to the European Union, effec-
tive January 1, 1994. The name European Community will still be considered correct, how-
ever, and will be used in this article.
3. Id.
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II. UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A. Definition of Culture
The amorphously defined word "culture" suffers from a multiplicity
of meanings. The Canadians have taken a broad view, believing culture to
be inclusive of the "knowledge, beliefs, attitudes and practices of a soci-
ety .... ,"4 In the broadest sense, the Canadians see culture as the embod-
iment of their national identity, an identity which is on the verge of ex-
tinction and becoming more Americanized each day.5
"To Americans, broadly speaking, culture is another service industry,
an outgrowth of their country's economic machine as surely as automo-
biles and apple pie."6 The claim to cultural sovereignty is at best a vague
nationalistic concept and realistically a feeble attempt at protectionism. 7
Under either definition, culture and its collateral industries have signifi-
cant financial worth. Since culture is quantifiable in monetary terms,
shouldn't it fit within the auspices of free trade like all other quantifiable
commodities?8
B. Historical Perspective
The 1988 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was a
landmark achievement in an otherwise long and somewhat jaded trade
history.9 The main objective of the FTA was to promote freer trade be-
tween the two countries and "build on their mutual rights and obligations
under the [GATT]." 10 The FTA created an open market between the
4. CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, OSGOODE HALL LAW
SCHOOL OF YORK UNIVERSITY, TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE 139 (Marc Gold & David Leyton-
Brown eds., 1988) [hereinafter TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE].
5. David Trigueiro, Cultural Cannons Fire Broadside, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 18, 1992,
at A4. See also Mary Lamey, Quebec Artists Enrich Culture of Canada: Film Executive
Shaping the Future, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Feb. 11, 1992, at B1 (quoting Harold Green-
berg, Chairman of Astral Inc., "We believe the country that loses the ability to express itself
is no longer a country.").
6. See Jeffrey Simpson, Living Beside a Cultural and Economic Colossus, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1986, §4 at 3. While such a view is a broad generalization, the official U.S. position
is to treat cultural products as any other quantafiable good, thereby giving credibility to this
assessment.
7. Laurie Watson, Cultural Sovereignty Issue, UPI, June 29, 1986, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI file. One Canadian author, attempting to explain the cause for such
difference of opinions, wrote, "[W]hen you are the dominant force in [selling] copyright...
it's hard to understand how the customer looks at it." Id.
8. See e.g., SERVICES POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (SPAC), REPORT ON: NORTH AMERI-
CAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT at 18-19 (1992); ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR TRADE POLICY AND
NEGOTIATIONS, REPORT ON THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT at 68-69 (1992).
9. See generally Jean Raby, The Investment Provisions of the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 394 (1990) (for a gen-
eral discussion on U.S.-Canadian trading history); see also Ann Carlsen, The Canada
United States Free Trade Agreement: A Bilateral Approach to the Reduction of Trade
Barriers, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 299, 301-2 (1989).
10. The United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 2 B.D.I.E.L. 359
1993
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world's two largest trading partners, phased out most tariffs within a ten
year period," applied national treatment1 2 to many parts of the service
sector, and greatly liberalized investment policies."3
Although "Canadians have recognized the existence of economic in-
terdependence with the United States and have sought the benefits of a
closer relationship," they have simultaneously feared the loss of Canadian
distinctiveness, autonomy, and independence. 4 So while the FTA broadly
embraced the principle of national treatment, several key sectors were
explicitly exempted from liberalization, among them Canadian cultural
industries. 5
C. The Cultural Industries Exemption
Cultural industries have been broadly defined to include all expres-
sions of a nation's culture." This encompasses all aspects of publication,
distribution, sale, exhibition or transmission of printed materials, music,
radio, and television.17 Under Article 2005.1 of the FTA, cultural indus-
[hereinafter FTA]. Article 102 of the FTA sets out five objectives: (a) Eliminate trade barri-
ers to goods and services; (b) Promote fair trade;(c) Liberalize the investment climate; (d)
Establish joint procedures to administer the FTA and to resolve disputes; (e) Promote fur-
ther cooperation on trade and investment issues both bilaterally and multilaterally. See also
RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., 1991 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANS-
ACTIONS 8 (2nd ed. 1991). "Free trade is a theoretical concept that assumes trade between
two or more parties unhampered by government measures such as tariffs or non tariff barri-
ers." Id. Basic to the notion of free trade is the concept of comparative advantage that
suggests "that a country or region should specialize in the production and export of those
goods and services that it can produce relatively more efficiently than other goods and ser-
vices, and import those goods and services in which it has a comparative disadvantage." Id.
at 3.
11. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE NAFTA PARTNERSHIP 2 (Govern-
ment of Canada ed., 1992) (available from the Canadian Consulate) [hereinafter NAFTA
PARTNERSHIP] (U.S. and Canada negotiated two rounds of accelerated tariff reductions in
1990, covering 400 items worth six billion in two way trade, and in July 1991, covering 250
items and two billion in trade).
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (The concept of National Treatment, encom-
passed in Article III, ensures that goods of a foreign sovereign shall be treated no less favor-
ably than domestically produced goods) [hereinafter GATT].
13. See generally FTA, supra note 10; Jeffrey J. Schott, United States-Canada Free
Trade: An Evaluation of the Agreement, INST. FOR INT'L ECON. POL'Y ANALYSES IN INT'L
ECON. 2, 4 (1988).
14. TRADE-OFFS IN FREE TRADE, supra note 4, at ix.
15. See FTA, supra note 10. (See Chapter 12, Articles: 1304, 1401, 1601, 1701, and
respective Annexes. Among sectors remaining protected are communications, transporta-
tion, oil and gas, uranium, agricultural support etc.).
16. See generally A.W. Johnson, Free Trade and Cultural Industries, in TRADE-OFFS
ON FREE TRADE, supra note 4, at 350 [hereinafter Johnson].
17. FTA, supra note 10.
Article 2012. Definitions
Cultural industry means an enterprise engaged in any of the following
activities:
(a) the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, periodicals, or
VOL. 22:1
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tries are exempted from the confines of free trade."s In effect, this deroga-
tion not only allows Canada to grandfather all its prior restrictive and
discriminatory laws but gives it the right to design legislation to protect
those industries in the future. 9
The one limitation to the Cultural Industries Exemption ("Exemp-
tion") is the retaliation provision of Article 2005.2.20 This Article states
that if Canada takes action that discriminates or has a negative impact on
American cultural industries, then the United States will have the right
to take retaliatory measures of equivalent commercial effect.
2 1
The United States was and remains the largest owner and producer
of cultural products in Canada.12 By 1986, American cultural producers
dominated the Canadian market." Considering that seventy-five percent
of all cultural products consumed in all of Canada are imported, the vast
majority of which are from the United States, it should be no surprise
that Canada wanted to protect cultural industries from extinction.
2 4
Given the dominance of the American cultural product on the Cana-
newspapers in print or machine readable form but not including the sole activ-
ity of printing or typesetting any of the foregoing,
(b) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of film or video recordings,
(c) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of audio or video music
recordings,
(d) the publication, distribution, or sale of music in print or machine readable
form, or
(e) radio communication in which the transmissions are intended for direct
reception by the general public, and all radio, television and cable television
broadcasting undertakings and all satellite programming and broadcast net-
work services.
Id.
18. FTA, supra note 10.
Article 2005.1 Cultural Industries
1. Cultural Industries are exempt from the provisions of this Agreement, ex-
cept as specifically provided in Article 401 (Tariff Elimination), paragraph 4 of
Article 1607 (Divestiture of an Indirect Acquisition) and Articles 2006 (Re-
transmission Rights) and 2007(Print-in-Canada Requirement) of this Chapter.
Id.
19. DEBRA P. STEGER, A CONCISE GUIDE TO CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREE-
MENT 49 (Carswell ed., 1988). See also JOHN D. RICHARD ET AL., THE CANADA-U.S. FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT 16 (1987). These rights are unilaterally given to Canada. United States
cultural industries assume no advantages or obligations via the FTA.
20. FTA, supra note 10. "Article 2005.2: Notwithstanding any other provisions of this
agreement, a party may take measures of equal commercial effect in response to actions that
would have been inconsistent with this agreement but for paragraph 1 [2005.1]." Id. See
Pamela Young, Dancing With An Elephant, MACLEANS'S, Sept. 19, 1988, at 37. (Retaliatory
measures need not be limited to the cultural sector. Canadians fear this is a convenient way
of pitting the Canadian cultural industry against other Canadian industries, thereby under-
mining the entire purpose of the exemption).
21. Id.
22. Simpson, supra note 6 (books at 81%; newspapers and periodicals at 91%; movies
90%; records 52%; royalties, licensing, rental fees 90%).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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dian market, the desire of Canadians to protect their "cultural identity,"
and the built in retaliation provision that enables the United States to
take actions of reciprocal commercial effect, the following question natu-
rally arises: Why was the United States' entertainment industry so ada-
mantly opposed to a cultural exemption in the FTA? In part, the consid-
erations were fiscal, but of far greater concern was the precedential value
that such an exemption would set for the international trading commu-
nity.25 Americans feared that other countries, whose markets were not as
saturated as Canada's, would demand similar derogations, the financial
effect of which could be devastating.
While the FTA is four years old and stands on its own record, the
arguments made regarding the cultural exemption are far from moot. The
perceived need to regulate the amount of foreign culture imported into
Canada is based upon the conviction that Canada's very survival as a dis-
tinct nation state is jeopardized by the overwhelming dominance of
American culture.2 6 To fully understand the presence of the Exemption,
we must explore Canada's rationale for withdrawing cultural products
from free trade negotiations. The success or failure of the Canadian argu-
ments is essential in determining if the Canadian exemption is a viable
precedent for other nations who also seek cultural exemptions.
D. Canadian Arguments
The Canadian arguments begin with the assumption that culture and
economics are inextricably intertwined, so changes in one will necessarily
effect changes in the other. As the Canadian and United States' econo-
mies become increasingly intertwined, it will be even more important to
protect Canadian culture, the remaining vestige of national identity. Sec-
ondly, the Canadians suggest that each country has sectors it wishes to
protect and justifies a cultural derogation on the same basis as the U.S.
justifies national security exemptions. Finally, Canada makes its most
compelling argument suggesting that the common language, geographic
proximity, and the parallel history it shares with the United States has
created unique circumstances that necessitate a cultural exemption.
1. Economics and Culture are Inextricably Intertwined, so Changes
in One will Necessarily Effect Changes in the Other 27
It is illogical, inefficient, and impossible for a relatively small trading
nation in an increasingly interdependent global economy to limit con-
sumption to their own products. 8 Assuming trade liberalization is a ne-
25. The FTA was envisioned as the model for all bilateral and multilateral negotiations
designed to set the tone for NAFTA, Enterprise for the Americas, and most importantly,
the ongoing Uruguay Round of GATT.
26. David Elton, Competing Perspectives on Trade, in CANADA-U.S.- FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 94 (Earl H. Fry et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter CANADA-U.S. TRADE AGREEMENT].
27. See generally Johnson, supra note 16.
28. Alan M.Rugman, Multinationals and the Free Trade Agreement, in TRADE-OFFS
VOL. 22:1
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cessity for economic viability in the world order, the question becomes
whether "we can separate the trade and economic aspects [of our lives]
from the social, cultural, and political dimensions which are the touch-
stones of our sovereignty."2"
When the FTA was negotiated, Japan, Europe, and the United States
were the three international centers of economic power.30 Economic sense
compelled Canada to affiliate with a trading power rather than get caught
in the cross-fire of a triad trade war.3 ' The United States was the only
logical choice for Canada, considering the geographic proximity, language
similarity, and long history of trade between the two nations.3 2 Unfortu-
nately, a closer trading relationship is inversely proportional to sovereign
autonomy.33 A broadened U.S. trading regime would undermine Canada's
economic independence, and, correspondingly, its political sovereignty. 4
Reduction of political sovereignty will place a premium on the preserva-
tion of culture, a nation's last link to a unique identity."
Pierre Juneau, president of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
(CBC), stated, "Much of what Canadians and most other nations consider
as culture, as essential to our sovereignty and therefore requiring atten-
tion and support by governments, the United States leaves to a large ex-
tent in the hands of private enterprise."36
"Canada is pre-eminently a political nation; the bonds of our na-
tionhood are primarily in the sphere of government and in activities deci-
sively shaped by government."" Accordingly, it is no surprise that the
"Canadians have built up one of the Western world's most costly subsidy
systems, providing rich grants for everything from automobile manufac-
turing to oil exploration."3 " Compared to Americans, Canadians accept a
stronger role of government in their daily lives and have come to expect it
in terms of services, financial assistance, medical care, and a host of other
ON FREE TRADE, supra note 4, at 4, 10.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see also ROBERT YOUNG, THE CANADA U.S. AGREEMENT & ITS INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXT 20-28 (1986).
33. Brenda Dalglish, Partners in Power, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 14, 1992, at 28.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Presentation to Center for International Affairs at Harvard, April 1986, quoted in
TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, June 22, 1986, at 5.
37. Donald Smiley, Impact on Canadian Policy Autonomy, in TRADE-OFFS ON FREE
TRADE, supra note 4, at 444.
38. John F.Burns, Why Canada Walked Out of Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1987, § 4 at 2. See also Trade Stakes are Getting Higher, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), July 25,
1992, at B4 [hereinafter Trade Stakes] ("Books, magazines, film broadcasts and other cul-
tural products are building blocks of a national identity. They are in many ways just as vital
to sovereignty as are weapons and other items vital to national security, and trade deals
routinely exempt goods related to national security.").
1993
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areas. 39 In light of the pervasive nature of American culture in every as-
pect of Canadian society, it is generally accepted that state intervention is
necessary "to create and support a countervailing cultural force to the
unrelenting flow of Americana across the border."4
2. Sensitive Sectors, Such as National Security in the United States
and Culture in Canada, Require Protection
As an underlying rationale to remove cultural industries from the ne-
gotiating table, the Canadians asserted that trade negotiations should
take place in the context of broader values that each country cherishes:
national security in the United States and cultural sovereignty in Ca-
nada.4 1 Interestingly, the objective of all trade liberalization agreements is
not free trade but "freer" trade. Trade officials generally recognize that
some restrictions on trade always remain in effect, even if those goods
and services are produced at a comparative disadvantage.42 '[S]elected
exclusions are part of virtually all free trade agreements. The size of the
exclusions typically reflect the differential in living standards or a recog-
nition of extreme import sensitivity of certain sectors."43 Accordingly, Ca-
nadian culture must be afforded the same preferential status that the
telecommunications, marine transportation, and energy industries enjoy
in the United States. 44
3. Language, Proximity and Heritage
Canada's most persuasive argument happens to be its most basic:
The endangered status of Canadian culture emerges from the unique cir-
cumstances presented by a shared language, geographic proximity, and
common heritage with the United States.
a. Language Factor
Ironically, as Canada attempts to preserve its culture from the unre-
lenting flow of Americana, it is faced with an internal cultural revolu-
39. See generally Rick Salutin, Culture and the Deal: Another Broken Promise, in
TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE, supra note 4, at 365.
40. Watson, supra note 7. The Canadian subsidy system contains tax breaks for pub-
lishers, movie investment incentives, content regulations, preferential postal rates for
magazines, as well as tariffs on imported records and other cultural products. Id.
41. Id. The cultural industries are the "building blocks of national identity [and] are in
many ways just as vital to sovereignty as are weapons ... to national security." Trade
Stakes, supra note 38, at B4.
42. FTA, supra note 10, at 359. (FTA essentially exempts the following industries
based on their "sensitive" nature in light of national interest: financial services, government
procurement, transportation, and energy).
43. Stewart & Stewart, Consideration of a North American Free Trade Agreement:
Need for Each Government to Examine Possible Exclusions 2 (Position Paper Prepared for
Libby Glass).
44. Jonathan Ferguson, Culture Not Part of Talks, Wilson Says, TORONTO STAR, June
14, 1991, at A3.
" VOL. 22:1
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tion . 5 For years French speaking Canadians, primarily domiciled in Que-
bec, have resisted the assimilation policy propagated by the national
government.4 1 In recent years, Quebequois have seriously entertained the
notion of seceding from the rest of Canada and thereby gaining their in-
dependent sovereignty."' Generally, American culture has affected Quebec
less than the rest of Canada.' Given that Quebec shares one of the most
populous borders with the United States and all aspects of its existence
have mirrored the rest of Canada, Quebec's relative disinterest in Ameri-
can cultural products supports the inescapable conclusion that language
has been an effective barrier to cultural assimilation."9
b. Geographic Proximity
Canada is almost twice the area of the United States, with only one-
tenth its population." Most Canadians live within 100 miles of the U.S.
border and have free access to American television and broadcasting sta-
tions." Such proximity gives the majority of Canadians the same access
to American cultural products as if they resided in U.S. territory.
c. Common Heritage
During the long trade history between the United States and Canada,
their economies have become interdependent.2 "All analysts have agreed
that bilateral free trade entails larger adjustments in the smaller econ-
omy."53 Complete integration between the two economies necessarily had
its effect upon Canadian cultural industries.5 Canada remains the fore-
most exporter of television to the United States, exceeding all other for-
eign programming combined, yet it accounts for only one percent of the
profits realized in the U.S. market.5 On the other hand, despite three
45. See generally Charles Falzon, Film, TV Central to Sense of Nationhood, TORONTO
STAR, June 17, 1991, at A21.
46. Id.
47. Mark Clayton, Trying to Save the Soul of Canada, The CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Sept. 21, 1992, at 14.
48. Id.
49. Ian Austen, Hispanic Culture: Will it Make its Presence Felt in Canada?, THE
OTTAWA CITIZEN, Aug 15, 1992, at B1 ("[C]ulture . .. is overwhelmingly determined by lan-
guage. Look at Quebec." (quoting historian Jack Granatstein)).
50. CALIFORNIA WORLD TRADE COMMISSION, CALIFORNIA, CANADA AND FREE TRADE: A
GUIDEBOOK FOR CALIFORNIA BUSINESS, § 3.4, at 19.
51. Id.
52. YOUNG, supra note 32, at 24.
53. Id.
54. Robert Lantos, Hollywood and Canada: Balancing the Scales, Notes for Remarks
at Luncheon Meeting of The California-Canada Chamber of Commerce, Sept. 22, 1992 at 8
(transcript available from Alliance Communications Corporation). In the words of Prime
Minister Trudeau, "Living next to you is in some ways like sleeping next to an elephant. No
matter how friendly and even tempered the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.
Even a friendly nuzzling can sometimes lead to frightening consequences." Id.
55. Fraser, supra note 1, at 12.
1993
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years of cultural protection, the United States maintains an eighty-per-
cent share of Canadian cultural domination." With advances in telecom-
munications technology, the spread of Americana will permeate even the
farthest reaches of Canada.5 Consequently, a cultural exemption is neces-
sary to prevent the otherwise inevitable absorption of Canadian culture
into that of its southern neighbor.
E. United States Responses
Americans have long viewed culturally restrictive policies as contra-
dictory to the philosophy of free trade, freedom of communication, and
the unencumbered flow of ideas." While Canadians argue that these poli-
cies tend to be either defensive or constructive in character rather than
externally aggressive, Americans have long held the view that such poli-
cies are no more than blatant protectionism.5 9 Canadians claim such poli-
cies reflect their desire to preserve and foster their cultural heritage.
While a meritorious goal by international standards, the negative eco-
nomic consequences are unacceptable to the United States.
Ultimately, the statistics are the most prolific defense to the Cana-
dian insistence of retaining the cultural industries exemption." Since the
FTA, Canada has instituted a wide variety of cultural preservation pro-
grams,6" none of which were considered economically harmful to Ameri-
56. Id. (As of 1992, after three and a half years of FTA, U.S. cultural products maintain
an ominous presence in the Canadian market. The following are percentages of foreign own-
ership in Canadian cultural industries, the majority of which is U.S. ownership: 97% of
films, 96% of television drama, 90% records and tapes, 76% of published books purchased
in Canada, 75% of magazines purchased in Canada. The total is 80% American ownership).
57. Id.
58. Denis Stairs, Canada's Trade Relations with the United States: The Non-Eco-
nomic Implications of an Economic Issue, in CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, supra
note 26, at 51 (Examples: (1) Deductibility of Foreign Advertising Expenses, (2) Simul-
casting: removal of U.S. advertising commercials and replacement with Canadian ones, (3)
Telecommunications Programming Services Act: imposes six percent tax on revenue of Ca-
nadian cable corporations that is used to subsidize Canadian programming).
59. Id. (One example was the Canadian decision to remove tax benefits for business
advertising in Time Magazine, a measure designed to prevent further new penetrations by
American interests and to give artificial support to indigenous alternatives).
60. Ottawa Must Look Beyond the Bottom Line to Protect Culture, THE GAZETTE
(Montreal), Aug. 4, 1991, at B3.
61. See Jamie Portman, Book Publishing Industry: Government Boosts Industry Aid
By 260%, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Jan. 29, 1992, at D12 (In April 1992, a new policy was
instituted that was designed to replace the Baie Comeau policy, which infuses $104 million
into Canadian book publishing and distribution industries over five years, representing an
increase of 260% capital infusion over existing levels); Federal and Provincial Governments
Come to Aid of Alberta's Cultural Industries, CANADIAN NEWSWIRE, Apr. 22, 1992 (On April
22, 1992, $7 million was committed to a joint project between the federal government and
Alberta to assist the province's film and video, sound recording, and book and periodical
publishing industries. "The Agreement is designed to strengthen long-term economic viabil-
ity of Alberta companies active in the cultural industries, expand domestic and interna-
tional marketing and distribution opportunities for Alberta's cultural products .... "). See
also Tu Thanh Ha, Culture Policy Calls For $57 Million Investment in the Arts, THE
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can cultural industries.2 Possibly the threat of retaliation under § 2005.2
dissuaded the Mulroney government from pursuing new cultural initia-
tives that might have adversely affected American cultural industries. 3
Alternatively, the absence of a United States complaint may simply be
attributed to the fact that their fears never came to fruition.
F. Summary
The United States believes that culture is a tradeable commodity,
while Canada maintains that it is inextricably intertwined with the sur-
vival of their sovereignty as a nation. 4 In the words of one Canadian au-
thor, "culture is a candy mint and a breath mint. It's simultaneously a
consumable product and a cherished articulation of a nation's soul ... If
it wasn't both a commodity and something more permanent then the re-
lationship between trade and culture would be nonexistent or irrele-
vant." 5 In light of the statistics, and the large number of Canadian cul-
tural industries owned by American interests, many consider the
Canadian cultural derogation a Pyrrhic victory.6 6 Notwithstanding the ex-
emption, figures at end of 1991 indicate the same statistical facts as in
1988 with the United States owning ninety-three percent of Canada's
movie and video revenues, ninety-two percent of book publishing, and re-
ceiving $350 million (U.S) from television and program sales. 7
Despite the rhetoric of then United States Trade Representative
Carla Hills that "there are no sacrifices, there are no tradeoffs,"'68 in refer-
ence to Amercian cultural industries, clearly they were bargained away. 9
Whether the tradeoff was for a minimum content on car parts or subsi-
dies on agriculture, we may never know. Despite the reasons for its exis-
tence, the derogation provides a precedent for exempting cultural indus-
GAZETTE (Montreal), June 20, 1992, at A5.
62. NAFTA Hearing Before the House Ways and Means Committee, Sept. 9, 1992
(Statement of USTR Carla Hills in response to question by Rep. Anthony (D-AR)).
63. Jamie Portman, U.S. Changing Tune on Protectionism; Beleaguered Canadian
Culture May Benefit From U.S. Move, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 27, 1991, at C2.
64. Robert Bragg, American Culture Strictly Business, CALGARY HERALD, July 24, 1991,
at A4.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Jonathan Ferguson, Culture, Jobs Give PM Trade-Talk Willies, THE TORONTO
STAR, July 28, 1991, at B4. See also Jeff Silverstein, Canada Wants to Guard Culture in
North American Pact, THE CHRISTIAN SCl. MONITOR, Nov. 13, 1991, at 8.
68. Intellectual Property and International Issues: Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the Committee on Judiciary
House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1991). (Response of United States
Trade Rep., Carla Hills, to question by Rep. Craig James (R-Fla.)).
69. Karen Tumulty & Joe Havemann, An Uncommon Market for U.S. Entertainment,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1990, at F2 ("One source recalls that when the United States struck a
free trade agreement with Canada a few years ago, Secretary of State James A. Baker III
telephoned [Jack] Valenti at home at midnight and said: 'I'm sorry Jack. We had to throw
you overboard.' ").
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tries that can be, and is, invoked in multilateral trade negotiations.
Pursuant to the derogation adopted in the FTA, the real issue now be-
comes whether other nations can rightfully protect their cultural indus-
tries within the auspices of free trade.
III. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) links the
economies of Canada, Mexico, and the United States. 0 The United States
entered the NAFTA negotiations determined not to grant Canadians the
cultural exemption they received under the FTA.71 It became increasingly
clear, however, that the exemption was an indispensable condition for Ca-
nadian participation in NAFTA. Despite the United States' verbal oppo-
sition, Canada received a cultural exemption in NAFTA that mirrored
the one negotiated in the FTA.
72
Although trade in culture was a contention between the United
States and Canada, Mexico announced that culture would not be an issue
to it and that "[t]he rights and obligations between Canada and Mexico
regarding cultural industries will be identical to those applying between
Canada and the United States. '73
While Hispanic culture is prominent in the United States, as evi-
denced by a multitude of Spanish radio, television, and cable networks
and a large indigenous population of Mexican ancestry, in Canada it is
not.74 Not only are Canadian and Mexican cultures vastly different, but
geographic distance and language differences serve as effective barriers to
significant integration."
In light of Mexico's relatively underdeveloped cultural sector, why
was it necessary for Canada to maintain the exemption as to Mexico?"
One explanation was that out of requisite fairness in multilateral negotia-
tions, derogations in favor of one country should apply to the other coun-
70. The NAFTA took effect on January 1, 1994.
71. But see Peter Morton, Mexico and U.S. Clash Over Energy Contracts: Trade Deal
Hits Last-Minute Snag, THE FIN. POST, Aug. 7, 1992, at 1 ("If one side held firm and the
other side wanted the deal, it was clear which way it had to go; Bush wanted the deal"
(quoting U.S. Trade Consultant Bill Merkin)).
72. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW & DESCRIPTION 19 (Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative ed., 1992).
73. NAFTA PARTNERSHIP, supra note 11, at 2 (In the cultural sector, Canada and Mex-
ico signed a Film and Television Co-Production Agreement in April 1991 in efforts to
"broaden financing and production opportunities for the film and television industries of
both countries.").
74. Austen, supra note 49.
75. Id.
76. Emil Zubryn, Mexican Film Industry Braces for Poor Year, HOLLYWOOD REP., Aug.
25, 1992, at 16 (Association of Mexican Film Producers and Exhibitors estimated no more
than 50 feature films will be produced this year. This might be overly optimistic since the
National Film Industry Chamber (Canacine) decided to no longer support the official Devel-
opment Fund for Quality Films.).
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tries in the same manner. This argument, however, is irreconcilable with
both the United States' and Canadian justifications for the exemption in
the FTA: namely that the exemption was needed to protect ailing Cana-
dian industries from relentless United States imperialism; a creature fed
by their joint history, common language, and geographic proximity.
Another possible explanation is that Canadian cultural industries are
so saturated by foreign interests that any subsequent foreign ownership,
no matter by whom or how minimal, would be devastating."7 Notwith-
standing these possible rationales, by allowing Mexico to accept such a
derogation, the Americans have undermined their own case by implicitly
endorsing the protection of culture within the auspices of free trade
agreements. 8 Accordingly, the United States should not be startled that
other nations, particularly the European Community member states, are
now lobbying for the incorporation of a cultural industries exemption
within the auspices of GATT.
IV. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
"No other market is as important for American exporters or our in-
vestors as is the market of the European Community.""8 With film and
television sales generating more than a $4.5 billion trade surplus, during a
time in which the United States' trade deficit continues to grow, clearly
"the prosperity of the American economy is increasingly tied to
Hollywood's well being."8 As domestic demand for television stagnated,"
American industries began looking to overseas markets as fertile deposi-
tories for their cultural products.82 Having saturated Canadian markets,
77. Heather Hartt, Lantos Blasts Valenti over NAFTA, HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 23,
1992, at 3, 16. "The Cultural exemption is not directed against the U.S. any more than it is
directed against Ireland or Spain or Australia, [ilt's directed toward Canada." Id.
78. See M. Jean Anderson et al., Intellectual Property Protection in the Americas: The
Barriers Are Being Removed, 4 Prentice Hall Law and Business J. Proprietary Rts. 2, 7
(1992). NAFTA is the first step in the goal of an enlarged FTA that encompasses all of the
Americas and has an accessions clause that will enable other countries in Latin America to
join. ABA Meeting Looks at NAFTA and Intellectual Property Rights, INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA), Apr. 22, 1992 (Much of the phrasing of the intellectual property part of NAFTA is
modeled after the Dunkel Text, further indicating the influential value NAFTA will have to
GATT negotiations.).
79. U.S. Welcomes Changes in Europe, But Fears of Trade Barriers Linger, AvIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., 127 (June 12, 1989).
80. Stokes, supra note 2.
81. Id.
Movie theater admissions are no higher now than they were in the 1960s. The
number of commercial TV stations, the single largest consumer of the indus-
try's product, is barely growing. And the average number of hours of broadcast
TV usage per household has plateaued, undermining advertising revenues that
determine what stations will pay for programs.
Id.
82. Id. ("By the year 2000, half of the revenues from American movies and records will
be earned in foreign countries."). See also Carl Bernstein, The Leisure Empire, TxM, Dec.
24, 1990, at 56.
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American attention focused on the European continent. With steadily ris-
ing per capita incomes, a combined population greater than that of the
United States, and a newly deregulated television industry, European
markets have become the newest venue for American cultural products."'
Since its inception in 1958, the European Community has joined with
the United States in pursuing freer trade and open markets. Despite their
common goals, both sides throughout their trading history have employed
a variety of protectionist measures resulting in bilateral conflicts.8 4 In
1992, the E.C. was added to the United States priority watch list that
identifies countries that maintain the most pervasive and egregious anti-
American trading barriers. 5 Not surprisingly, in a manner of diplomatic
quid pro quo, American measures deemed protectionist by the European
Community were the subject of an annual report entitled "Problems with
Doing Business with the United States." 8
While the United States runs a trade deficit with Europe in a num-
ber of economic sectors, the sale of U.S. videos, movies, music, and televi-
sion programs account for a trade surplus of more than $8 billion (U.S.). s"
Overseas revenues of Hollywood studios have doubled in the past five
years. If this trend continues, overseas sales may soon exceed domestic
revenues.8 Coupled with this growth trend is the incontrovertible fact
that American programming dominates European markets, while Euro-
pean Community programming has but a de minimis appeal outside na-
tional boundaries.8 9
83. Id.
84. Trade Relations E.C.- U.S.A and E.C.- Canada, COOPERS & LYBRAND E.C. COMMEN-
TARIES, Oct. 8, 1992 at § 2.2.
85. Among the barriers identified as egregious was the Broadcast Directive promulgated
in 1989. Id.
86. Id.
87. Noreen Janus, Hollywood Meets the NAFTA, AM. CHAMBER OF COM. OF MEX. Bus.
MEX., May 1992. See also Steven Greenhouse, Europe Reaches TV Compromise; U.S. Offi-
cials Fear Protectionism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1989, at Al (some estimates suggest 70% of
entertainment shows are of American origin); Clyde H. Farnsworth, U.S. Fights Europe
TV-Show Quota, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1989, at D1 (television producers collected $630 mil-
lion in programming revenues in European Community representing two-thirds of the for-
eign sales); Jonathan Weber, Turning the Volume Down; Hollywood Nervous Over Possible
European TV Quotas, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 1989, at B1 (sales of movie and television pro-
grams are worth more than $800 million annually); Jacqueline Frank, European Television
Without Borders or Without Americans?, THE REUTERS LIBRARY REPORT, July 26, 1989.
(1989 U.S. film and television industry contributed $2.5 billion trade surplus, with television
sales alone over $600 million).
88. Briefs: Overseas Fortunes, HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb. 18, 1992, at 6. Presently, external
sales account for 42% of Hollywood studio revenues with continued growth projected. Movie
revenues from foreign theaters will grow to $4.95 billion by the year 2000, up from $2.27
billion in 1991. Hollywood's rentals amounted to 15% of movie revenues and will likely grow
to 19% by 2000. Janus, supra note 87. TV programming, to Europe, accounts for $600 mil-
lion annually. Growth in these sectors has been attributed to a number of factors including
great advances in technology and the recent deregulation of many European broadcasting
systems. Id.
89. The Audiovisual Industry, PANORAMA OF E.C. INDUSTRY 26-8.
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A. Television Without Frontiers Directive
On October 3, 1989 the European Community, by a vote of ten to
two, adopted a broadcasting directive, known as Television Without
Frontiers ("Directive"), aimed at regulating trans-European television
broadcasting." The goal of the Directive is to encourage development of
the European television industry, a step considered essential in achieving
continental unification." While the Directive covers a broad array of cul-
tural policies,9" the most controversial section creates a regime in which
50.1% of member state television programming, excluding news, sports,
game shows, and advertising, must be of European origin.8 This objective
may be achieved by, among other things, the use of quotas94 and subsi-
dies.9 5 The goal of the Directive is preservation of a "European cultural
identity" that, the E.C. contends, is being eroded excessively by American
programming.9 Although the United States immediately denounced the
Directive as a violation of free trade principles and warned the European
Community of possible trade repercussions, the Directive remains in force
and is the foundation of European cultural policy.97 The rationale under-
Nearly 72% of programs purchased by Community Members come from the
United States whilst only two percent of the audiovisual product broadcast
across the Atlantic are Community origin . . . Not only is there a lack of com-
munity program exports but also 90% of these programs never cross the fron-
tiers of their country origin.
Id.
90. Timothy M. Lupinacci, Note, The Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities in
the European Community: Cultural Preservation or Economic Protectionism?, 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 113, 115 (1991).
91. Audiovisual Communications, COOPERS & LYBRAND, E.C. COMMENTARIES, March 25,
1993, § 3.1, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD file [hereinafter Audiovisual
Communications].
92. Id.
93. Council Directive of 3 Oct. 1989 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid
Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pur-
suit of Television Broadcasting Activities, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. 23 (1989). Article IV:
Member states shall ensure where practicable and by appropriate means, that
broadcasters reserve for European works, within the meaning of Article VI(a),
a majority proportion of their transmission time, excluding the time appointed
to news, sports events, games, advertising and teletext services. This propor-
tion, having regard to the broadcaster's informational, educational, cultural,
and entertainment responsibilities to its viewing public, should be achieved
progressively, on the basis of suitable criteria.
Id. 28 Am. Soc'Y OF INT'L L., Nov. 1989.
94. See Weber, supra note 87. Quotas have the effect of depressing prices by dividing
the market into local and foreign segments. Accordingly, European shows will increase in
value being able to satisfy the local content requirement while the price of U.S. programs
will drop with an ensuing glut in the market. Id.
95. Lupinacci, supra note 90, at 116.
96. Id. at 120.
97. See generally Paul Presburger et al., Television Without Frontiers: Opportunity
and Debate Created by the New European Community Directive, 13 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 495 (Spring 1990); Brian L. Ross, "I Love Lucy," But the European Commu-
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lying the Directive has been the basis for a series of related directives
aimed at preservation of European culture.98
The European Community cites three broad justifications for its po-
sition: (a) the Directive is a political rather than a legal commitment that
contains no enforcement provision and leaves implementation to individ-
ual member states,99 (b) since United States sales account for only
twenty-eight percent of the rapidly growing E.C. television market, Amer-
ican industries will have ample opportunity to grow,' 0 and (c) culture is
not like all other tradeable commodities. While culture has quantifiable
monetary value, it simultaneously represents the essence of national sov-
ereignty and thereby must be treated differently than common tradeable
goods.
1. The Directive is Merely a Political Commitment
Supporters of the Directive argue that it is a political rather than a
nity D6esn't: Apparent Protectionism in the European Community's Broadcast Market, 16
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 529 (1990). For a broader discussion of European Broadcast Directive see
Suzanne M. Schwarz, Television Without Frontiers?, 16 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 351
(Fall 1991).
98. Transatlantic Television Can You Spare a Reel?, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 19, 1989,
at 56; Adam Dawtrey, EC Crackdown on Subsidies Dropped, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 16,
1990 [hereinafter Dawtrey]. In recognition of Europe's rapidly developing broadcast sector
and the need to remove the physical, technical, and fiscal barriers that exist between states,
the Commission has adopted a broad base media policy consistent with the mandates
promulgated by the Treaty of Rome. While the effect of the Broadcast Directive has not
been immediately devastating, U.S. cultural industries live in fear that the European Com-
munity will continue to impose an array of protectionist measures that will greatly disad-
vantage them. Robert Marich, AFMA Blasts EC 'Rental Rights', THE HOLLYWOOD REP.,
July 2, 1992, at 3, 24 [hereinafter Marich]. The "rental rights" directive received approval
on October 28, 1992 with implementation to begin in July of 1994. In addition to establish-
ing regulations to combat piracy, the directive "seeks to establish across the countries of the
EC an agreed definition of the potential artistic beneficiaries of the video-rental exploitation
of films made within the EC, and at the same time to establish a rule of equitable renumera-
tion for all involved." Audiovisual Sector a Major Political Issue in GATT Talks, INFORMA-
TION SERV. TECH. EUR., No.0076, Nov. 5, 1992. The home video tape directive calls for mem-
ber states to collect a levy on "rental or lease transactions for videocassette, CDs and other
software, the proceeds of which will go to European cultural projects." Susan W. Liebeler et
al., EC 1992 and its Potential Effects on the United States Entertainment Industry, ENT.
L. REP., June 1989, at Legal Affairs Vol. 11 No. 1. In at least three EC member states a tax
is levied on the sale of empty video cassettes, the proceeds of which are used primarily to
compensate European copyright holders as well as promote or subsidize local cultural indus-
tries; Karen Tumulty et al., An Uncommon Market for U.S. Entertainment, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 1990, at F2; Susan W. Liebeler et al. EC 1992 and its Potential Effects on the
United States Entertainment Industry, ENT. L. REP., June 1989 at Legal Affairs Vol. 11
No. 1. In the spirit of EC media policy, a number of states have imposed screen quotas
thereby limiting the number of foreign films shown in domestic theaters. Furthermore,
many countries require a dubbing license be bought before showing a dubbed film or alter-
nately require dubbing to be performed domestically. For a full discussion of the entire EC
Media Policy see generally Audiovisual Communications, supra note 91.
99. Lupinacci, supra note 90, at 123.
100. Id. at 124.
VOL. 22:1
TRADE IN CULTURE
legal obligation, implicitly suggesting that the European Court of Justice
would not take action if faced with a member state in violation of the
Directive's mandates."' In support of this view, many have suggested
that without the Directive the United States would face an array of dif-
ferent quotas resulting in a regime far more restrictive, more difficult to
administer, and far less predictable.' °0
2. United States' Sales are Minimal in a Growing European Market
A combination of events, including the staggering rate of technologi-
cal advances and the recent deregulation of broadcasting stations across
Western Europe, "has created a number of new generation broadcasters
hungry for ratings and starved for commercial television."' 03 The United
States' television and film industries, being the most lucrative U.S. export
behind aerospace, sold programming worth $844 million to the E.C. in
1988 with profits expected to triple by the end of 1992. ' 04 Despite these
figures, European statistics show American programming sales to be far
below the fifty percent limit.'05 With the European audio-visual market
growing by nearly eleven percent each year, the European Community
suggests that Amercian sales will not stagnate or decline but rather
101. Steven Greenhouse, Europe Reaches TV Compromise U.S. Officials Fear Protec-
tionism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1989, at Al.
102. Tyler Marshall, European Community Sets Quota For Television Imports, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1989, at Cl.
103. See Weber, supra note 87 (advances in telecommunications have enabled Ameri-
can TV to reap profits through sales to European network, cable and satellite services). Fred
Hift, TV Trade War Heats Up, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 2, 1989, at 10 (the
American business has created a new group of European entrepreneur who are dependent
on popular U.S. programming to maintain their ratings). See The Audiovisual Industry,
PANORAMA OF E.C. INDUSTRY 28-1 ("the EC audiovisual industry has experienced significant
growth. Television which only ten years ago was almost exclusively controlled by the public
sector, is now largely privatized."); Bethany Haye et al., Eureka Has Golden Message for
U.S.: No Euro TV Quotas, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 3, 1989 (In past two years Europe has
consumed 15 years worth of American production. With all the new channels projected to be
opened, not even the Americans could fill the void.).
104. Lupinacci, supra note 90, at 126.
105. Marshall, supra note 102. David Kelly, Fritts Says Valenti is Ringing EC Alarm
Too Soon, HOLLYWOOD REP., June 29, 1992, at 4, 16. The U.S. industries are not close to the
50% quota. Penetration is at 25%, suggested the National Association of Broadcasters Pres-
ident Edward Fritts, therefore the quotas are not nearly as detrimental as MPAA suggests.
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increase. °e
Generally, local programming remains the best selling commodity
within an E.C. member state, but as among foreign programming, the
United States' programming is the product of choice. 101 For example, in
Germany domestic programs will typically be preferred to American pro-
grams, but given the choice between American programs and programs
produced in other member states, German viewers will choose the pro-
grams from the United States.01 The fact remains that while American
exports account for the vast majority of foreign films in Europe, only fif-
teen percent of European films are seen outside their national bounda-
ries. 09 United States producers "have gained because of superior distri-
bution across the E.C. region, better marketing, and because they have
been able to win marginal sales in the European Community at low prices
that can be [subsidized] by sound profits already earned" in the domestic
U.S. market."0 Despite American fears and the proliferation of a variety
of new cultural directives,"' U.S. television industries remain a dominant
force in European sales." 2 As one commentator put it, "The Hollywood
lead is so enormous - in TV and movies - that the Europeans will have
How the Definition of European Can Vary, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1989.
European content of TV in Member States
Belgium 71%
Denmark 77
France 67
Greece 78
Ireland 61
Italy 54
Luxemburg 48
Netherlands 70
Portugal 66
Spain 65
UK 69
West Germany 83
Average Total 68%
106. Clyde H. Farnsworth, U.S. Fights Europe TV-Show Quota, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
1989, at D1 (Television is expected to grow to 400,000 hours in 1990s from 250,000 hours in
1987. The U.S. sells 70,000 hours of TV time to Europe (1990) and hopes to have it increase
threefold by 1995 representing 4 billion in sales.); GATT to Examine Broadcasting, THE
FIN. TIMES, June 28, 1990 (The number of channels expected to double by year 2000); Mar-
shall, supra note 102 (By 1995 an estimated 120 major channels will be looking to fill more
than 200,000 additional TV hours by 2000). See also ECONOMIST Aug. 19, 1989; David
Dodwell, U.S. Filmmakers Focus on Uruguay Round: The Audio- Visual Trade Tussle Has
Come to a Head in Geneva, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at 4.
107. John Marcom Jr., Empty Threat?, FORBES, Nov. 13, 1989, at 43.
108. James Ulmer, Euro, U.S. Lawmakers Trade Views in L.A. on TV Quotas,
HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 25, 1989.
109. Joel Kotkin, How the West Was Lost? Why the Sun Won't Set On the Empire
Built By the Anglo-Americans, THE WASH. POST, July 5, 1992.
110. Dodwell, supra note 106.
111. See Dawtrey, supra note 98.
112. Id; see also Dodwell, supra note 106.
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to run faster just to keep up.11' 3
3. Culture is Different from Other Tradeable Commodities and its
Unique Nature Requires it to be Protected
The Directive represents merely one of many recent efforts claiming
to be the vanguard of a collective European culture.' 4 While such cul-
tural directives' 9 go beyond the powers conferred by the Treaty of
Rome,"1 which established a purely economic alliance, they fall directly
within the purview of the Maastricht Treaty, which elevates culture to a
level of importance equal to that of other major community policies.1 7
The European Commission's main objective was to preserve the history of
the European people by supporting their cultural endeavors at home and
creating avenues for its dissemination throughout the world."' Critics
suggest that the concept of "a common European heritage" is dubious
coming from a continent that has been ravaged by two World Wars and
has seen the likes of Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler." 9 But recent evi-
dence suggests that European youth are increasingly finding commonali-
ties not merely in fashion, music, and food but in attitudes, values, and
lifestyles. 20 Commonalities among European youth are increasingly anti-
American and distinctly European."'
The preservation of cultural values and national identity as a compo-
nent of sovereignty is a well established goal of international agreements.
For example, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
promulgated by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 rec-
ognizes free expression as a fundamental human right.12 2 Similarly Article
1(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirms
the right of all peoples to "freely determine their political status and
113. Id.
114. Adam Dawtrey, EC Crackdown on Subsidies Dropped, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 16,
1990 (at least 6 of the 12 members are urging the Commission to take an official stance on
protecting European culture).
115. See Marich, supra note 98.
116. Dawtrey, supra note 114.
117. Culture: Single Market Should Favor Cultural Exchanges, EUR. Soc. POL'Y, May
14, 1992. See also EC Scriptwriters, Directors, and Producers of Cinematographic Works
Call for Enquiry into U.S. Trade Practices, REUTER TEXTLINE AGENCY EUROPE, Nov. 18,
1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD file.
118. Id.
119. U.S. 'Outraged' By EC Move To Restrict Foreign TV Programs, Will File GATT
Case, Hills Says, 6 INT'L TRADE REP., BNA, 1292 (Oct. 11, 1989); David Dodwell, U.S. Film
makers focus on Uruguay Round, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at 4 (the EC is a market that is
fragmented for both cultural and lingual purposes).
120. Jeff Kaye, The Rave of Europe, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1993, at El.
121. Id.
122. UN Declaration HR, Article 19: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."
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freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.' 1 23
Both the European cultural directives and the cultural derogations
granted to Canada are based on the right of a sovereign nation to protect
its culture and regulate its own internal broadcast industry.' 24 Then Eu-
ropean Community president Jacques Delors framed the issue as a matter
of cultural survival, stating that "[e]ach country should be able to defend
its own culture . . . . Culture is not a piece of merchandise like other
things . . . we have [a] right to exist, to perpetuate our traditions.' 2 5
The unique nature of cultural products necessitates their regulation
outside the traditional rules of economics that underlie a free trade sys-
tem. Modern international trade is based on a theory first propounded by
David Ricardo in 1817, known as comparative advantage. The theory of
comparative advantage "holds that a country or region should specialize
in the production and export of those goods and services that it can pro-
duce relatively more efficiently than other goods and services, and import
those goods and services in which it has a comparative disadvantage."' 26
Cultural products do not fit well within such a scheme. First, price is
not always the determinative factor in their purchase, and second, ineffi-
cient producers are still motivated to produce despite economic loss. 2 '
Therefore, treating cultural works as a tradeable commodity would force
it to exist under a theory of economic Darwinism, a fate that would lead
to the production of cultural works by a few low cost producers. This
result is not only incongruous with numerous treaties protecting culture
but also threatens national sovereignty by disabling the country's ability
to express itself.
Most countries employ a wide variety of subsidy schemes recognizing
the need to protect cultural endeavors that are not profit generating nor
self sustaining.12  For example, Native American crafts in the United
States may not have survived without significant government subsidiza-
tion. Similarly, the cultural directives promulgated by the European
Community benefit far more than the film and television industries but
have substantial impact upon non-profit cultural works. "
While official United States policy refuses to accept culture as any-
thing more than a tradeable commodity, the European Community sim-
123. JOSEPH SWEENY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, DOCUMENTARY SUPPLE-
MENT 67 (1988) (quoting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 1:1).
124. Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the International "Free Flow" of Infor-
mation, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 372, 382 (1990).
125. Greenhouse, supra note 101.
126. RALPH FOLSOM ET AL., INT'L Bus. TRANSACTIONS, DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT (1991)
at 3.
127. Theater arts have long been associated with a nation's cultural endeavors yet re-
main dwarfed in profitablility compared to revenues from film and television.
128. See generally Trade Relations E.C.-U.S.A. and E.C.-Canada, COOPERS & LYBRAND
E.C. COMMENTARIES, Oct. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD file.
129. Id.
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ply points to the cultural derogation granted to Canada in both the FTA
and NAFTA, as well as American domestic restrictions on the ownership
of entertainment industries, and argues that the mere existence of such is
de facto proof that culture deserves protection.'3 0
B. Reactions of the United States
In direct response to the Broadcast Directive, the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives introduced and unanimously passed Resolution 257 that de-
nounced the Directive as a contravention of GATT and merely "another
episode of protectionism hiding behind the masque of patriotism."' 3 ' The
United States' reaction to the Directive has been the foundation from
which it argues against all culturally protectionist measures. The Con-
gressional rejection of the Directive, as compared to their approval of the
FTA, suggests that there is a distinction between the cultural exemption
granted to Canada and the cultural policies that the E.C. continues to
propagate.
The United States consistently defends the derogation granted in
favor of Canada as one strongly objected to, but necessary for the benefits
of freer trade and supports its position through three severable argu-
ments: (1) the geographic proximity, shared history, and similarity of lan-
guage has inextricably intertwined Canada and the United States thereby
creating a unique relationship deserving of special treatment in certain
areas; (2) Canada's situation is unique because its cultural industries are
so highly saturated by foreign investment; and (3) the United States has
never conceded the validity of a cultural exemption and has explicitly
reserved the right to take retaliatory measures against foreign actions
harmful to American cultural industries. 3 2
1. Proximity, Language, and History
The derogation insisted upon by and granted to Canada was more a
matter of comity and understanding than official United States policy.
While it is clear that due to geographic, economic, social, political, and
linguistic factors, Canada and the United States share a unique co-exis-
tence, it does not necessarily follow that a "cultural derogation" is
uniquely applicable only between them. Rather, the European Commu-
nity suggests that with the onslaught of modern technology capable of
transferring information at the touch of a button, the United States has
been able to expand its markets with ease.'3" Further, with English rap-
130. Roy Denman, Television Without Frontiers, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1989, at A23.
131. House Approves Resolution Urging U.S. Action To Protest Television Program-
ming Directive, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. 1384 (Oct. 25, 1989) (Resolution 257 voted on October
23, 1989 by 342 to 0); Lupinacci, supra note 90, at 128 (the U.S. responded by bringing the
E.C. into arbitral proceedings as proscribed by GATT article XXII/XXIII under the charge
that the Directive violates the Most Favored Nation and National Treatment provisions).
132. See text accompanying note 20.
133. See supra note 88.
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idly becoming the lingua franca of the modern world there is no effective
difference between the road from Hollywood to Vancouver as compared
to the road from Hollywood to Brussels. In time the United States' indus-
tries will overwhelm their European counterparts, and Americana will be-
come the adopted culture of the world.
2. Canada's Cultural Industries are Completely Saturated with For-
eign Investment, Justifying their Unique Treatment
The Canadian situation is not one of economic dominance but one of
mere survival. The official United States position does not expressly ac-
knowledge that the saturation levels of the Canadian cultural industries is
a factor in granting the derogation to Canada. But, in light of American
dominance in their market, the internationally recognized right to express
one's sovereign culture, and the interest in a comprehensive free trade
agreement, American saturation of Canada becomes a legitimate point.
In essence, the European Community witnessed what happened to
Canada, feels similarly susceptible to the American machinery, and would
rather take preemptive measures than find themselves unable to produce
a domestic product in the future.""
The United States is quick to point out the facial inconsistency of
allowing citizens to select parliamentary leaders but not television pro-
grams, yet, does not address the issue of when a country can legitimately
control domestic broadcast content and when that control turns into pro-
tectionism.135 The European Community argues that a quota and subsidy
regime is one of preventative maintenance, justified by the proposition
that by the time the E.C. is as saturated with American cultural products
as Canada, it is already too late."3 6
3. The United States Never Conceded Validity of a Cultural
Derogation
Former U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills has repeatedly stated
that the "cultural derogation [was] taken and I use the word taken be-
cause it was not given it was taken and we also took the right to retaliate
if it is exercised .... "s137 Interestingly, the retaliation provision has never
been invoked.' Whether this is due to want of cause or that the political
134. Leyla Ertugrul, European Parliament Clears "TV Without Frontiers", THE REU-
TER LIBR. REP., May 24, 1989, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 180 and 181. The FCC places limits of all kinds
on programming content from language to nudity that are allowed under European stan-
dards. What FCC labels as appealing to the prurient interest to Europeans is merely part of
their culture. Accordingly, U.S. objections to E.C. content restrictions are hypocritical.
136. Jack Valenti, Television With Manacles, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1989, at A27.
137. News conference with Carla Hills, Former U.S. Trade Rep., on Sept. 18, 1992, at
77.
138. NAFTA Intellectual Property Provisions In North American Trade Pact Called
"Model", INT'L Bus. DAILY, Aug. 20, 1992.
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ramifications of using retaliation are too costly is not entirely clear.189 The
method through which the United States would retaliate is § 301 of the
United States Trade Act of 1974 as amended by the Omnibus Trade Act
of 1988.140
The amended Act instructs the U.S. Trade Representative to create a
"watch list" and a "priority watch list" consisting of those countries
promulgating practices that are otherwise burdensome, restrictive or vio-
lative of American rights and interests. 14 1 Use of § 301 is a drastic mea-
sure, one not entirely consistent with GATT, and for that reason has been
the focus of much international debate. 142 In essence, the threat of a
§ 301 sanction hangs over the heads of all U.S. trading partners as essen-
tially a mechanism of last resort to safeguard American interests. 14 As
with all such considerations, the following question arises: if such a pow-
erful trade weapon is used, will the benefits outweigh the costs?144
Although the European Community has articulately advocated ex-
cluding culture from the GATT, the E.C. certainly does not stand
alone. 48 "Most Third World countries... [feel] that governments should
retain the right to control the import of films and TV or video program-
mes in order to safeguard national cultures."'4 6 Mochtar Lubis, president
of the Press Foundation of Asia, explained the Third World fear of West-
139. Tumulty, supra note 98, at F2.
140. Title III, Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C 2411 (Supp. 1993);
If the United States Trade Representative determines under section 304(a)(1) that -
(A) the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are being denied; or
(B) an act, policy, or practice'of a foreign country (i) violates or is inconsistent with, the
provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement,
or
(ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce;
the Trade Representative shall take action ...
141. M. Jean Anderson et al., Intellectual Property Protection In the Americas: the
Barriers Are Being Removed, PRENTICE HALL L. & Bus. No. 4; J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 7,
Apr. 1992 (in 1992, nine countries were on the priority watch list and 22 countries were on
the regular watch list, one of which was Canada).
142. Free Trade's Fading Champion, ECONOMIST, Apr. 11, 1992, at 65 (Use of section
301 against Japan, India and Brazil in 1989 has put the world on notice of the powerful
weapon contained therein. Its extended use, however, which may indeed be violative of
GATT, would only lead to a number of reciprocal protectionist measures and the ultimate
derogation of the free trading system).
143. Id. See also Bob Davis, Kantor Takes Tough Stance on Trade With Europe, Ja-
pan at Senate Hearing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1993, at A2. (The article suggests that the new
USTR Mickey Kantor would advocate the use of Section 301).
144. Id.
145. Chakravarthi Raghavan, Governments May Lose Right to Control Foreign Films,
TV Shows, THIRD WORLD NETWORK FEATURES 2, 1990. Countries in favor of cultural restric-
tions include Australia, Canada, Nordic Countries, Egypt, India, and most Third World
countries.
146. Id. at 2. See also David Dodwell, U.S. Filmmakers focus on Uruguay Round: The
Audio-Visual Trade Tussle Has Come to a Head in Geneva, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at 4
("[Simaller players such as Australia and India share EC concerns that their own film in-
dustries might be hurt if U.S. companies win unfettered access to their markets.").
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ern cultural domination by pointing out that "[m]odern communications
[are] a powerful instrument to influence the attitudes, habits, tastes, per-
ceptions of many people around the world .... Thus communications
penetrate into the deepest layers of the societal fabric and of culture.'
147
V. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
"Today, culture may be [a] country's most important product, the
real source of both its economic power and its political influence in the
world."' 4 In direct response to the promulgation of the European Broad-
cast Directive, the U.S. House of Representatives unanimously passed
Resolution 257 denouncing the Directive as a "blatantly anti-U.S. action"
in violation of international trade agreements.'4 9 Lobbyists have been
quick to point out that the entertainment industry is America's second
largest exporter and is responsible for the viability of a number of collat-
eral industries, all of which employ thousands of people.' 0 As a result,
the United States has actively opposed further E.C. cultural directives
and demands a withdrawal of those presently in existence. The United
States lodges a variety of complaints all based on the theory that Euro-
pean Community cultural directives violate GATT. Unfortunately, analy-
sis of the GATT regime does not shed light on the subject and tends to
raise more questions than answers.
A. The GATT Regime
The United States claims that culturally restrictive legislation, such
as the Broadcast Directive, violates Articles I W and IIP of GATT by
placing quantitative restrictions on all non-European cultural products.'53
147. Cate, supra note 124, at 381.
148. Bernstein, supra note 82, at 56.
149. H.R. Res. 257, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H6558. The vote was 342 in
favor of the resolution and none opposed, with 90 abstentions. 135 CONG. REC. H7357. Rep.
Frenzels said the cultural exemptions claimed by Europe were no more than "the last refuge
of trade scoundrels." Id. at H7330 (statement of Rep. Frenzels). "The Directive is one of the
first signals of what the United States can expect from Europe in 1992 and comes across
more like a red flag flying over Fortress Europe than as a friendly initiation to be neighbors
in a global telecommunications village." Id. (statement of Rep. Markey).
150. Tumulty, supra note 98. The U.S. entertainment industry generates a vigorous
trade surplus estimated to be US$3.5 to four billion per year. Id. Western Europe sales
account for more than one-half of the industry's total sales outside the U.S. Id.
151. GATT, supra note 12, at 194. Article I MFN treatment requires all contracting
parties to grant each other treatment as favorable as they give to any country in the applica-
tion and administration of import and export duties and charges. No country is to give
special trading advantages to another or to discriminate against another. MFN automati-
cally extends bilateral agreements to all GATT members without the need for multilateral
negotiations. This automatic trade liberalization mechanism is considered the cornerstone of
GATT. There are exceptions to MFN, however, including an exception for Free Trade Areas
in Article XXIV. Id.
152. See GATT, supra note 12.
153. Suzanne Michele Schwarz, Television Without Frontiers?, 16 N.C. J. INT'L & COM.
REG. 351. The U.S. collaterally argues that the Article XXIV exception to MFN for free
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The European Community contends that the Directive regulates cultural
works that are services and therefore GATT does not apply to them.'6 4
Notwithstanding the E.C. position, even if cultural works are construed
as goods properly regulated under GATT, the United States' reliance on
GATT as the vanguard of its interests is misplaced. First, GATT does not
clearly prohibit cultural content restrictions. Second, the United States
provides similar protection for its own domestic entertainment industry,
some of which may violate GATT. Third, harm to U.S. industries is spec-
ulative and accordingly will not support a GATT claim.
1. GATT Does Not Clearly Prohibit Cultural Content Restrictions
European observers are surprised at what they call "the very aggres-
sive stance taken by the United States administration against European
Community cultural rules."' 5 A spokesman for the European Community
emphasized that the Community's rules of origin are completely "compat-
ible with the GATT."'16 Several GATT provisions allow derogations from
GATT obligations.
a. Article XXV: Waiver
GATT Article XXV:5 provides that a country may, when its eco-
nomic or trade circumstances warrant, seek a derogation from particular
GATT obligations.'5 7 A waiver would allow the European Community to
suspend most favored nation status and national treatment obligations to
trade areas does not apply. A free trade area is defined under Article XXIV:8(b):
A free trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of com-
merce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII,
XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the
constituent territories in products originating in such territories."
GATT, supra note 12, at Art. XXIV:8(b).
Although the European Community is a free trade area, the United States contends
Article XXIV does not allow a free trade area to increase any rate or duty in a manner
inconsistent with GATT.
154. See generally GATT, supra note 12, at 194 (at its inception, GATT was designed
to facilitate only the trade in goods, not services.).
155. GATT: U.S. Will Submit Rules of Origin Proposal at Next Meeting of GATT,
USTR Hills Says. 6 INT'L TRADE REP., (BNA), 1152 (Sept. 13, 1989).
156. Id.
157. GATT Article XXV:5 reads:
"In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agree-
ment, the Contracting Parties may waive an obligation imposed upon a con-
tracting party by this Agreement; Provided that any such decision shall be ap-
proved by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority shall
comprise more than half of the contracting parties. The Contracting Parties
may also by such a vote
(i) define certain categories of exceptional circumstances to which other
voting requirements shall apply for the waiver of obligations, and
(ii) prescribe such criteria as may be necessary for the application of this
paragraph.
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non-E.C. nations permitting the operation of the Directive's European
content restrictions.
Although the United States argues that the Directive violates Arti-
cles I and III, the United States has benefited from a similar waiver.
Nonetheless, the United States and Canada concluded an agreement in
1965 that provided for preferential duty free entry of Canadian auto parts
into the United States.1 5 Auto exporting GATT nations such as Great
Britain and the former West Germany objected to the pact as a violation
of Most Favored Nation treatment (MFN). 56 The United States sought
and was granted a waiver of its MFN obligations even though it conceded
that the agreement violated Article ."60
The European Directive presents a strikingly similar situation: a lo-
cal content regulation promulgated within a regional trading area. Argua-
bly, cultural content restrictions are no different than the American auto
part restrictions suggesting that a GATT waiver may likewise apply.
b. Article XIX: Escape Clause
Article XIX, the Escape Clause, is an exception to GATT Article XI
prohibiting quotas.' The Escape Clause allows GATT member states to
impose quotas on products that are being imported in increased quanti-
ties and that cause, or are likely to cause, serious injury to competing
domestic producers.'62 Arguably, the increase of American entertainment
products in European markets has caused serious injury to domestic pro-
ducers. Subsequently, Article XIX:3(a) would permit the European Com-
munity to impose a quota on American entertainment imports to the ex-
tent and for the period of time considered necessary to rectify the injury
158. United States-Canadian Automotive Products Agreement, Jan. 16, 1965, entered
into force Sept. 16, 1966, 17 UST 1372, TIAS No. 6093. See also Stanley D. Metzger, The
United States-Canadian Automotive Products Agreement of 1965, 1 J. WORLD TRADE L.
183 (1967).
159. S. REP. No. 782, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1965). Canada argued that although
the Agreement technically violated GATT Article I, the net effect would be an expansion of
trade, and the Agreement would be applied in a non discriminatory manner in conformance
with GATT goals. Id.
160. See Report of the GATT Working Party, quoted in Harold Hongjuh Koh, The
Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on the Proposed United States-Ca-
nada Free Trade Agreement, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 193 (1987).
161. GATT, supra note 12, at 194.
162. Id. Art. XIX:1(a) provides:
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obliga-
tions incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff
concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that con-
tracting party in such increased quantities and under conditions as to cause or
threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or di-
rectly competitive products, the contracting parties shall be free, in respect of
such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to pre-
vent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to
withdraw or modify the concession.
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to European producers. '
c. Article XXI: Security Exception
An exception to both Articles I and III is Article XXI, which pro-
vides "[niothing in this Agreement shall be construed . . . to prevent any
contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests.' 164
One of the central European arguments in support of the Directive is
that the development and preservation of European cultures remains vi-
tal to the formation of the E.C. as a political entity. 6 The E.C. argues
the Directive expresses "cultural sovereignty," within the political power
of the sovereign. 6 Given the political component of cultural content re-
strictions, some scholars argue that ". . .the film, broadcast and sound
recording industries of many countries outside the U.S. are considered to
be purveyors of national culture and deserving of the treatment accorded
to national security.' 67
163. Id. Art. XIX:3(a) provides:
If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the
action is not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue
the action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or
continued, the affected contracting parties shall then be free, not later than
ninety days after such action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of
thirty days from the day on which written notice of such suspension is received
by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the application to the trade of the con-
tracting party taking such action, or in the case envisaged in paragraph 1(b) of
the Article, to the trade of the contracting party requesting such action, of
such substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under this
Agreement the suspension of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not
disapprove.
See Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Non-Discriminatory Application of Article XIX GATT:
Fact or Fiction, Legal Issues of European Integration 1981/2 at 39-41. It has been suggested
that the Escape Clause cannot justify cultural content restrictions because many commenta-
tors believe such a quota under Article XIX must be applied nondiscriminately. However,
Article XIX:3(a) indicates that a quota may be directed specifically at the "contracting
party that is taking such action" to cause harm to domestic producers; Mark Koulen, The
Non-Discriminatory Application of GATT Article XIX(1): A Reply, Legal Issues of Euro-
pean Integration 1983, at 89-95, 110-11.
164. GATT, supra note 12, at 194.
165. 135 CONG. REC. H7326 at 7328 (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino), "These [EC] am-
bassadors claimed they were integrating their markets and solidifying Europe economically
and politically." Id.
166. Id.
167. GATT Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Geneva, 1955, 44, quoted in
Keith Acheson and Christopher Maule, Trade Policy Responses to New Technology in the
Film and Television Industry, 23 J. WORLD TRADE L. 35, 47-48 (1989); see also Kelly L.
Wilkins, Television Without Frontiers: An EEC Broadcasting Premier, 14 B.C. INT'L. &
COMp. L. REV. 195 n. 81 (1991).
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d. Article XVIII: Governmental Assistance to Economic
Development
Article XVIII allows nations to impose trade restrictions in order to
foster economic development. While Article XVIII generally applies to
less developed countries (LDCs), Article XVIII:4(b) indicates that devel-
oped nations may also use quotas to establish a particular industry."0 8
GATT practice shows Article XVIII can be successfully invoked by non-
LDC countries to justify trade restrictions, provided they apply to an in-
fant industry critical for the nation's further economic development. 6
Canada has argued that it is in some ways a "third world nation cul-
turally;" until a few years ago it "published fewer children's books than
Uganda."' 0 Similarly, the European Community seeks to promote its au-
dio-visual industry as an engine of economic growth.' 7 1 Both the EC and
Canada recognize the multiplier effect that the entertainment industry
has upon collateral industries. Accordingly, development of the motion
picture and television production industry will spur expansion in related
businesses and create jobs. 1 2
e. Article IV: Motion Pictures
Article IV permits nations to set screen quotas mandating that a cer-
tain percentage of all films shown in a country are of domestic origin.1
7 3
168. GATT, supra note 12, at 194.
Article XVIII:4(a) provides that nations that "can only support a low standard of living
and are in the early stages of development shall be free to deviate temporarily from the
provisions of the other Articles in this Agreement...". In contrast, Article XVIII:4(b)
states that a nation "the economy of which is in the process of development, but which does
not come within the scope of sub-paragraph (a) above, may submit applications to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES under Section D of this Article.". Section D and Section C,
paragraph 13, allow a member nation that qualifies under Article XVIII:4(b) and that finds
"governmental assistance is required to promote the establishment of a particular industry
with a view to raising the general standard of living of its people," may impose trade restric-
tions that would otherwise violate GATT. There is a caveat: there must be no other action
permitted by GATT that would achieve the particular development objective. See Article
XVIII Section C, paragraph 13.
169. See, e.g., Agreement with Romania on Trade Relations, Apr. 2, 1975, T.I.A.S. No.
8159, at Art. 1(3) (effective 3 August 1975), cited in Howard Liebman, Comment, GATT
and Counter-trade Requirements, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 252, 260.
170. Don Mitchell, A Publisher Who Isn't Waiting for a Miracle, 19 B.C. BUSINESS,
Dec. 1991, No. 12, § 1 at 27.
171. Arthur Dimopoulos, The Television Without Frontiers Directive: Preserving Cul-
tural Integrity or Protectionism?, 13 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 293 (1993) [hereinafter
Dimopoulos].
172. Bernstein, supra note 82, at 56.
173. Article IV provides the following, in relevant part:
If any contracting party establishes or maintains internal quantitative restrictions relat-
ing to exposed cinematographic films, such regulations shall conform to the following
requirements:
(a) Screen quotas may require the exhibition of cinematographic films of national origin
during a specified minimum proportion of the total screen time actually utilized, over a
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Its provisions are similar to those of the Directive, the major difference
being that Article IV applies only to films while the Directive covers a
wider range of cultural works.
Article IV is the clearest indication that cultural industries were in-
tended to be exempt from GATT. Article IV was negotiated in the early
GATT rounds immediately following World War II. At the time, motion
pictures were well established, as was American domination of the indus-
try. Motion picture production in many countries outside the United
States was slow to recover from the wartime manpower and material
shortages, yet people were eager to see new movies. 174 Germany's film in-
dustry had flourished during the Reich as an artistic as well as a propa-
ganda power. Not only did it suffer from the devastation of the war, par-
tition, and postwar recession, but it was the special target of American
occupying forces who sought to eradicate the Nazi propaganda film ma-
chine. Motion pictures, having substantial influence on society, played an
important propaganda role during the war for both the Allies and the
Axis.
Negotiators in 1947 could not have predicted the current explosion of
films, cable television, satellite transmissions, videocassette, and audio
works. Cultural content restrictions clearly follow the logic and spirit of
Article IV differing only in scope by encompassing works that the original
GATT negotiators could not possibly have foreseen. 17 5
2. The United States' Opposition to Cultural Restrictions is Incon-
sistent with Its Practices that Protect the Domestic Entertain-
ment Industry
The United States has long resisted efforts by other nations to limit
the impact of American cultural exports. 7  The American opposition,
specific period of not less than one year, in the commercial exhibition of all films of
whatever origin, and shall be computed on the basis of screen time per theater per year or
the equivalent thereof; .... See GATT, supra note 12.
174. American motion picture exports soared in the late 1940's.
175. See Cate, supra note 124, at 410. The counter-argument forwarded by the U.S. not
only ignores the postwar explosion of cultural industries but also lacks logical consistency:
Article IV is portrayed as a partial exemption for motion pictures and spells out the only
allowable regulations nations may impose on any cultural works, all other cultural works
being under the purview of GATT. See also Schwarz, supra note 153.
176. See Schwarz, supra note 153. The debate began with Third World resistance to
post-World War II American control of the international broadcast industry. In the 1950's
and 60's, U.S. domination of the international media was justified by First Amendment and
free market values supporting an unregulated flow of communications. By 1970, UNESCO
was urging a balanced, regulated flow of information to preserve national cultures. U.S. per-
ceived Third World calls for media regulation as censorship; concerned that regulations
would hamstring its domination of the international communications industry, the U.S.
withdrew from UNESCO in 1984. The Directive and other cultural preservation efforts
shifted the focus of the cultural debate to the entertainment sector. Because the entertain-
ment industry is critical to the balance of trade, the U.S. shifted its response to trade terms,
basing its objections in GATT language despite its own well-established protection of its
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however, is hypocritical in light of a number of United States domestic
practices that mandate similar cultural safeguards. This inconsistency in-
validates the American argument that cultural restrictions violate GATT.
a. First Amendment restrictions are justified on cultural grounds
The United States has applied the First Amendment to oppose cul-
tural restrictions abroad and to impose them at home. Freedom of speech
is not completely free in America; the First Amendment has been used to
regulate speech to conform with social norms. For example, restrictions
on fighting words, defamation, and obscenity are based on majoritarian
American cultural values.'77
The Directive regulates the content of advertising by restricting com-
mercials for tobacco, alcohol, prescription drugs, and by establishing an
entire regime for advertisements aimed at children, among others. 79 Sim-
ilarly, restrictions on commercial speech have been imposed to limit the
freedom of speech that United States advertisers have when discourse
concerns an activity regulated by social norms.7 9
b. Many FCC regulations are cultural restrictions
Many FCC regulations restrict freedom of speech on the grounds
that it is necessary to promote the health, safety, and well being of view-
ers in conformity with majoritarian cultural norms. These regulations are
often similar to the cultural restrictions imposed by the Directive.' The
similarities suggest that the United States, like the European Commu-
nity, recognizes the importance of regulating the media in order to pre-
serve cultural values.
c. U.S. concern for American viewers is not exported
In an illustrative contrast to American attitudes toward Europe and
domestic industry. Id.
177. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15 (1983) (the definition of obscenity as being based in "community
standards").
178. Dimopoulos, supra note 171.
179. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding
restrictions on commercial speech regarding gambling).
180. AUDIOVISUAL COMMUNICATIONS, COOPERS & LYBRAND, E.C. COMMENTARIES, Oct. 15,
1992 [hereinafter COOPERS & LYBRAND]. For example, the FCC regulates programming and
advertising aimed at children. Similarly, the Directive provides restrictions on "broadcasts
which may be potentially harmful to the physical, mental and moral development of chil-
dren and young people, particularly those containing pornography or gratuitous violence or
inciting hatred for a particular race, sex, religion or nationality, should be identified as such
by broadcasters in programme announcements and must not be shown during hours in
which minors are commonly in front of the television." Right of Reply, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920,
1930 (1989). This Directive provides for the right of reply to personal attacks and political
messages. The FCC has similar guarantees of the right of reply and equal time for political
rebuttals.
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the Third World, in upholding the FCC personal attack rule, the United
States Supreme Court said "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters that is paramount .... It is the right of
the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetics, moral
and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here."' 8' The U.S. oppo-
sition to the efforts of other nations to protect cultural industries is
clearly hypocritical in light of its own reactions when its domestic indus-
try is subject to foreign control. The United States has shown it places
more emphasis on the preservation of its own culture than on the rights
of other sovereigns to protect their cultures.'82
d. Harm to United States entertainment industry is speculative
Given the explosion of the international broadcast and film industry,
"with more broadcasting hours on more channels, the Directive should
not hurt American sales." ' It is considered unlikely that the United
States' share of the European market will reach the 49.9% limit set by
the Directive. 84 If the United States is unable to show actual harm to the
American entertainment industry, then a claim under GATT will not be
successful.18 5
3. United States Protectionism of Domestic Cultural Industries
May Violate GATT
While the United States contends cultural regulations such as the
Directive violate GATT, several United States practices could be consid-
ered equally violative. Even if those practices do not present clear GATT
violations, they do indicate the U.S. not only recognizes the need to pro-
tect its cultural identity but will also take action to do so. Any challenge
to cultural restrictions under GATT would not likely succeed if the
United States was practicing the same type of restrictions in order to pre-
serve its own domestic cultural industries.
For example, the public service aspect of broadcasting has been in-
voked to justify FCC regulations on the nationality of broadcast station
owners.'8 6 This FCC regulation could be considered violative of GATT
Article III because foreign citizens are not accorded the same treatment
181. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the personal
attack rule regulating broadcast media).
182. Id.
183. Leyla Ertgul, European Parliament Clears "TV Without Frontiers," REUTERS LIB.
REP., May 24, 1989.
184. John M. Broder, Hollywood Opposes Trade Pact, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993.
185. See GATT, supra note 12, at Art. XXIII.
186. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b). Federal law prohibits foreign citizens from more than 25%
ownership of broadcast stations; foreign citizens cannot be officers of a corporation that
holds a broadcast license. The most publicized example of the FCC ownership regulations
involves Rupert Murdoch, a native of Australian who became a U.S. citizen in order to
purchase the Fox TV network. Id.
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as United States citizens.
Americans object to European and Third World efforts to preserve
their cultures yet reacted vehemently when several landmark Hollywood
movie studios were purchased by foreign corporations.187 Former U.S.
Representative Leon Panetta of California introduced a bill in 1991
aimed at limiting foreign ownership of Hollywood studios and other
American cultural industries.'88 "We ought not to allow our motion pic-
ture industry and related firms to be run from abroad. The United States
stands to lose both its artistic license and its integrity as a truly American
institution through the intangible but sure process of foreign owners' dis-
creet discretion, implicit censorship, or pervasive corporate
philosophy. '"18 9
4. Conclusion
Reliance on GATT rules as the basis for United States opposition to
European cultural directives is misplaced. Even if the GATT regime was
applicable to trade in culture, the outcome would not be certain. Inspired
by this confusion, the European Community has advocated the treatment
of cultural products as services under a proposed General Agreement of
Trade in Services (GATS).
VI. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES
A. Introduction
"In 1987, the United States introduced to members of the GATT a
comprehensive proposal for liberalizing trade in services. The proposal
called for the GATT to recognize "the sovereign right of every country to
regulate its services in industries subject only to an external control over
measures which had [the] purpose or effect of restricting market access
by foreigners.' 190
Pursuant to this declaration, formal talks on a GATS were begun.
The European Community envisioned that cultural products, being ser-
vices, would be addressed under a GATS. In contrast, the United States
maintained that cultural products like all other tradeable goods must be
reconciled within GATT.
187. Jamie Portman, U.S. Changing Tune on Protectionism; Beleaguered Canadian
Culture may Benefit from U.S. Moves, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 27, 1991, at C2. The foreign
purchases included the following: Matsushita Electronics Industrial Company of Japan
bought MCA for $6.16 billion; Sony bought CBS Records. Sony also bought Columbia Pic-
tures for $3.4 billion. Id.
188. The Bill died in subcommittee (telephone conversation between author and former
Congressman Paneta's staff, October 1992).
189. Id.
190. Lupinacci, supra note 90, at 138.
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B. Definition of Services
Among the obstacles plaguing GATS negotiations is the lack of a
generally accepted definition of services. One author defined services as
"[t]hings which can be bought and sold but which you cannot drop on
your foot."' 91 While negotiations have progressed beyond this impotent
definition, they have not gone far enough to placate all interested parties.
Generally, services are processes that require "personal contact between
the provider and the consumer."' 9' They "involve the dissemination of
skill and knowledge. . . and entail the movement of either the provider or
the receiver to the other."'9 3 While cultural products clearly involve the
dissemination of "skill," they do not require personal contact. Some cul-
tural products also have a tangible quality because they exist in physical
form, such as film reels, that makes their classification as a "service" par-
tially inaccurate. This sentiment was echoed in the European Audiovisual
Charter that stated "audiovisual works are an essential element of cul-
ture, and therefore cannot be considered services."' 94
The European Court of Justice, in the few cases that tangentially
address this issue, has been unable to resolve this dichotomy. In State v.
Sacchi,96 the court distinguished between the transmission of television
signals and the product being transmitted, holding the former to be a
service and the latter a good. The court ultimately concluded that "a tele-
vision broadcast must, because of its nature, be regarded as a supply of
services."' 9 6 Pursuant to Sacchi, the physical product can be regulated
under GATT yet its transmission is necessarily excluded. While such an
analysis is a plausible attempt to grapple with the unique nature of cul-
tural products, alone it is insufficient as the linchpin reasoning for why
culture must be treated as a service. Nonetheless, the European Commu-
nity and a number of other nations remain wholeheartedly in favor of
treating culture as a service. The EC has made crystal clear that they
were not willing to envision a GATS in the audiovisual sector if their
191. A GATT for Services, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1985, at 20.
192. Lupinacci, supra note 90, at 135.
193. Id. at 136.
194. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 180, at § 7.2. The Audiovisual charter also known
as the Delphi Declaration was promulgated in September 1988 by the European federation
of Audio-visual producers representing industry professionals from the 12 E.C. member
states, Austria, Cyprus, Hungary, Iceland, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and For-
mer Yugoslavia. Its other main provisions included the following statement: "The cultural
and linguistic identity of every nation must be safeguarded through financial support and a
system of broadcasting quotas.". Id. "The concentration of production and broadcasting in
the hands of a few individuals or multinationals is a threat to democratic rights. The inde-
pendence of artistic expression must be protected from political and commercial pressures".
Id.
195. Case 155/73, State v. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. 409, 427, 14 COMM. MKT. L.R. 177, 201
(1974). Aff'd in Procureur du Roi v. Marc J.V.C. Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. 833, 31 COMM. MKT.
L. R. 362 (1981).
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cultural concerns were not met,"7 meaning a complete exemption of cul-
tural industries from any agreement on services on the ground that "un-
fettered imports would dilute European culture."' 9 s Since cultural prod-
ucts do not fit well within the definition of services, the E.C. and its
cultural allies do not want cultural products included in a potential
GATS, it would be nonsensical for culture to be railroaded into a services
agreement when major disagreements still exist on important sectors,
such as maritime transport, air transport, financial, and telecommunica-
tions services that account for more than 75% of potential trade in
services.'9 9
In reality, culture is no more a good than a service. Accordingly, the
threshold question becomes not as much how to classify culture but how
should it be treated under international trading rules? All multilateral
trading endeavors begin with the realization of mutual objectives. The
difficulties lie in the reconciliation of the various formulations espoused
to accomplish those objectives. The United States wants to exploit the
economic advantages that come with exporting its culture while remain-
ing committed to respecting the identities and valued traditions of other
sovereigns. Similarly, the European Community wants to preserve its cul-
ture while reaping the economic benefits from its dissemination. 20 0 Cul-
ture, like services, is an area of first impression under GATT, therefore it
deserves similar treatment but not a similar definition. Such treatment
consists of identifying products to be liberalized, obtaining multilateral
concessions that create the parameters of its trade, and incorporating the
agreement within the underlying principles of GATT.
VII. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN CULTURE
Although cultural works cannot properly be classified as goods or ser-
vices, it must be recognized that they are cultural expressions that have
quantifiable economic value. In recognition of this duality - the multi-
billion dollar international trade in culture and the basic principle of
GATT to include rather than exclude economic issues - it is the conclu-
sion of this article that cultural works are hybrids: an inextricable mix-
ture of culture and commerce and that in recognition of their unique
characteristics must be considered separately from a GATT or GATS
regime.
Freer trade might benefit a nation's overall economy but usually at
197. Intellectual Property, Copyright Group Assails EC's stance in GATT talks, See
Prospects as Bleak, DAILY RPT. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Nov. 1, 1990, at A-16.
198. Id.
199. E.C. Negotiators Attack U.S. GATT Offer Exempting Key Sectors in Service
Talks, 58 BANK RPT. (BNA), Mar. 30 1992, No. 13, at 570.
200. Bruce Stokes, Tinseltown Trade War, NAT'L J., Feb., 23, 1991, No. 8 at 432. "The
Community has a strong cultural heritage and we wish to preserve these national and re-
gional identities." The best way to accomplish this goal is to "ensure a minimum amount of
TV programming in local languages, produced by local film-makers." Id.
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the expense of its lesser developed industries.2 0 ' "The law of comparative
advantage says that a country should specialize in what it does best [b]ut
it turns out that a lot of what makes up a country's comparative advan-
tage is created by government policies on everything from education to
government procurement."' ' On the other hand, under a system of man-
aged trade, the government uses trade and other policies to implement an
industrial strategy and encourage the development of key industries. As
these industries mature, they will gain strength, ultimately being able to
compete in a free market. In the United States, managed trade is seen in
the automobile, maritime transport, financial services, telecommunica-
tions, textiles, agriculture, and a host of other industries. 03 Managed
trade "is the only viable alternative in the real world to protectionism"
2 4
and must be employed to ensure "commitments by nations to accept cer-
tain proportions of imports in their domestic markets." ' 5
GATT in many senses is the ultimate free trade agreement uniting
108 countries in the goal of removing all trade restrictions.0 ' Since its
inception in 1948, GATT has been very successful in reducing the number
of managed goods and progressively removing barriers to their free trade.
Notwithstanding its successes, the GATT implicitly realizes that trade
liberalization is a slow and deliberate process. "Highly sensitive industries
can be seriously harmed through. . . liberalization efforts, with long term
consequences to shareholders, workers, communities and regions of a
country."' 7 The concepts of freer and managed trade are not antithetical
but rather adjacent steps in the process transcending isolationism to-
wards free trade.
Under an envisioned General Agreement on Trade in Culture
(GATC), cultural products would be traded under managed circum-
stances with the understanding that as industries matured, trade would
be liberalized. This scheme would recognize the vital social need to pre-
serve a nation's culture as well as the fiscal aspects attached to the sale of
cultural products. The removal of culture into a separate agreement
would alleviate the pressures of manipulating GATT articles to accommo-
date the elusive concept of culture, facilitate a GATS by allowing parties
to concentrate on a comprehensive list of negotiable services and ensure
the survival of a diversity of cultural expressions no matter how small or
unprofitable they may be.
201. Dalglish, supra note 33.
202. Id. quoting Andrew Jackson, senior economist with the Canadian Labor Congress.
203. Id.
204. Leonard Silk, Head Off a Trade War, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 4, 1993, at A23, quoting
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VIII. CONCLUSION
"In many ways, language is the essence of culture." Presently, the
people of the world speak approximately 6000 languages, "[b]ut some-
where between 20% and 50% of those languages are no longer being spo-
ken by children. That doesn't mean they're endangered, [iut means
they're doomed."2 '
Currently 660 languages are safe from extinction because they are
either spoken by more than 100,000 people or because "they are protected
by the government. [A]t the rate things are going, the coming century will
see the extinction. . . of 90% of the world's linguistic diversity. It is
doubtful whether a culture can survive without a language. . . forcing us
to consider what the cost would be of losing 90% of the world's
cultures." 0 9
Globalization of the world's cultures is due to a number of homogen-
izing forces, such as multinational corporations, immigration, and global
media.21 0 Threats of cultural genocide exist not only directly from bullets
and bulldozers but indirectly from television, films and radio. The state
of cultural arrest in Canada is a sad example of that fact. Although una-
ble to reclaim significant portions of their market, the cultural derogation
granted to Canada has been the impetus for a number of cultural endeav-
ors used to preserve their struggling cultural regime. The world, a witness
to the Canadian situation, remains fearful of a cultural imperialism the
sole goal of which is not enrichment but economic profit. As a result, the
E.C. has embarked upon a bold program of cultural imperatives designed
to foster the continued growth of cultural industries. "Americans don't
understand the serious nature of cultural politics in Europe. [T]he cur-
rent political environment, Europe-wide TV deregulation and the subse-
quent mushrooming of the European market would have been politically
impossible without a cultural safety net of some kind." '
The Broadcast Directive and subsequent culturally based directives
are the price paid for such liberalization. While protectionism is contrary
to free trade in goods, it has long been considered the rule and not the
exception when it comes to trade in services. Trade in culture, being a
hybrid combination of both a good and service, is furthermore inextrica-
bly combined with national sovereignty and cannot justly be treated as
one or the other. If the United States continues to treat culture as a
tradeable good, the European Community and its allies will refuse to ad-
dress culture in any multilateral trading arrangement, leaving U.S. cul-
208. Mitchell Stephens, Brave New World; Pop Goes the World; MTV in Prague, Pad
Tai in Topeka - As the World Shrinks, Cultures Blend and Diversity Disappears, L.A.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 17, 1993 at 23, quoting Michael Krauss professor of linguistics at
University of Alaska.
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tural products as victims of unrestricted national policies. While respec-
tive negotiating positions have been defined, the unique nature of trade
in cultural products makes a victory under ill-suited GATT or GATS re-
gimes impossible for either side.
By accepting that culture is unique and addressing it in its own fo-
rum, the fears of cultural imperialism on the one side and blatant protec-
tionism on the other will be eradicated. The European Community will be
forced to make market access commitments and possibly bifurcate its in-
dustry to protect unprofitable cultural works and simultaneously begin
liberalization for films, television, and other profitable cultural endeavors.
A comprehensive negotiation would enable concerned countries to limit
market access in order to foster cultural industries as well as to bind
countries to timetables, liberalization levels, and prevent the pure domes-
tic regulation of trade in culture.
One author has analogized our state of cultural globalization to mix-
ing paint. "When you first begin stirring many different-colored paints in
a can, you get some colors that clash, but you also get some beautiful
rainbow patterns. Maybe that is the period we are in now .... The Ques-
tion is: What will human culture look like after the paint can has been
stirred a century or two longer?" '
212. Stephens, supra note 208, at 22.
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